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Robust Contract Conditions Under the Newly Introduced 
BTO-rs Scheme: Application to an Urban Railway Project† 
By KANGSOO KIM* 
Few studies have specifically focused on the uncertainty of demand 
forecasting despite the fact that uncertainty is the one of greatest risks 
for governments and private partners in PPP projects. This study 
presents a methodology for finding robust contract conditions 
considering uncertainty in travel demand forecasting in a PPP project. 
Through a case study of an urban railway PPP project in Korea, this 
study uncovered the risk of excessive government payments to private 
partners due to the uncertainty in contracted forecast ridership levels. 
The results allow the suggestion that robust contract conditions could 
reduce the expected total level of government payments and lower user 
fees while maintaining profitability of the project. This study offers a 
framework that assists contract negotiators and gives them more 
information regarding financial risks and vulnerabilities and helps 
them to quantify the likelihood of these vulnerabilities coming into play 
during PPP projects. 
Key Word: PPP, BTO-rs, Contract Conditions, Robustness, 
Uncertainty, Forecast, Ridership 
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  I. Introduction 
 
he Korean government started in 1994 to push Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
projects to encourage private participation in infrastructure investments. By 
providing various forms of government support, and the PPP model has emerged as a 
well-established procurement method for many types of infrastructure and public 
facilities.  
Despite such positive aspects, however, PPP projects in Korea face criticism due 
to unexpected hikes in the government’s payments to private partners through the 
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minimum revenue guarantee (MRG) scheme1 as well as high user fees. Numerous 
projects, including the Incheon International Airport Expressway and the Nonsan–
Cheonan Expressway, have shown that actual out-turn traffic volumes were far 
below than the contracted traffic agreed-on levels in concession agreements, 
resulting in higher government payments. In addition, road PPP projects such as the 
Seoul Ring Expressway are meeting resistance from users due to fees higher than 
those of publicly financed projects. 
Accordingly, the Korean government had made strong efforts to reduce its 
financial burden and lower user fees by extending concession periods, sharing 
refinancing gains, and changing the contract conditions through renegotiations with 
private investors. In particular, the Korean government introduced a risk-sharing 
scheme for built-transfer-operation (BTO)2 projects in 2015 to low high user fees 
by reducing private partners’ project risk and to reinvigorate the modality, i.e., the 
BTO risk-sharing project scheme (BTO-rs).  
Even with the BTO-rs scheme, contracted forecasting demand levels for facilities 
also become one of the most important contract conditions between the government 
and private partners because unexpected hikes in government payments and user fees 
are closely linked to the inadequacy in dealing with uncertainty in contracted 
forecasting demand levels. As the level of contracted demand for a facility increases, 
the operating income also increases, and this can lower the construction cost subsidy, 
the level of investment cost sharing by government, and the user fees related to the 
project. In addition, the lower the contracted demand for the facility is, the higher 
the government’s construction cost subsidy and investment cost sharing levels 
become, with a higher level of user fees also arising. Therefore, contracted 
forecasting demand is the one of most salient risks for the government and private 
partners when implementing a PPP project. Despite this concern, simple average and 
aggregated point demand forecasts that ignored the potential for unexpected 
fluctuations have been used. 
The uncertainty in travel demand forecasting is caused by factors such as uncertain 
input data, limitations of the predictive models used, and the characteristics of the 
project under analysis. There are compelling reasons for undertaking travel demand 
forecasting even with deep uncertainty. Travel demand forecasting is conducted 
through the traditional four-step model where numerous input variables, such as the 
population and employment rate, are predicted and where it is assumed that the 
predictions are correct. However, a more suitable expression would be ‘properly 
estimated’ rather than ‘accurate’. Thus, as the steps progress, due to ‘properly 
estimated’ data entailing inevitable errors mitigated by inappropriate (or non-
realistic) model specifications for each step, the level of uncertainty expands. Biased 
decisions by analysts also add uncertainty to travel demand forecasting. 
To consider the uncertainty in travel demand forecasting, existing approaches 
assume that the distribution of traffic demand forecasting is known or the uncertainty 
is calculable. Accordingly, demand forecasting in PPP projects is inadequate when 
 
1 In the MRG scheme, the government guarantees the predetermined contract revenue through government 
payments when the actual outturn revenue falls below the contract revenue. 
2In a BTO contract, the private partner builds the infrastructure, transfers ownership to the government and 
operates for a concession period to recoup its investment. Meanwhile, in a BTL contract, the private partner builds 
the infrastructure, transfers ownership to the government and recoups its investment through government payments.  
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dealing with the uncertainty. Simple average and aggregate point demand forecasts 
are applied, and negotiations do not take into account unexpected increases in 
government payments or bankruptcies of projects stemming from the uncertainty in 
the contracted forecasting demand.  
The explanatory approach known as robust decision making (RDM) is a promising 
tool for dealing with uncertainty in travel demand forecasting. RDM, exploring 
acceptable policies under deep uncertainty is mainly applied to topics such as water 
resource management, disaster prevention, and climate change, all of which entail 
relatively large events with extended analysis periods. However, recently, the scope 
of these subjects is being expanded, with RDM now applied to various disciplines. 
Using RDM, it is possible to approach the travel demand forecast problem more 
reasonably. The RDM approach tests possible future states specified by a wide range 
of decision spaces, with these utilized for characterizing areas of vulnerability 
(Marchau et al., 2019). As such, the method is readily applicable to travel demand 
forecasting, as unpredictability is part of the method. The framework of the RDM 
approach, termed the inversed ‘predict-then-act’ framework, easily finds factors that 
could not be identified by the existing ‘predict-then-act’ scheme. Thus, it enables more 
explanatory, rational and adaptive policy establishment outcomes for the future. 
The purpose of this study is to apply the RDM approach to present a methodology 
for finding robust contract conditions 3  which minimize negative effects on 
governments and private partners considering the uncertainty in travel demand 
forecasting in PPP projects. In other words, this study suggests acceptable and robust 
BTO-rs contract conditions to ensure the best performance of a PPP project. Because 
this unlike forecast-then-contract approaches, this study suggests bottom-up decision 
making regarding the contract condition for dealing with vulnerability properly and 
minimizing any negative effects caused by uncertainty in demand forecasting. 
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Chapter I presents the study’s 
purpose and background and Chapter II introduces the concept of uncertainty in 
demand forecasting and existing methods that attempt to consider uncertainty. This 
chapter also presents a literature review of PPP contracts assuming that the 
uncertainty in demand forecasting is controllable or the result of demand forecasting 
is accurate. Chapter III introduces the concept of the BTO-rs scheme with a 
schematic representation of typical cash flows. This study also involves a case study 
of an urban railway PPP project. Chapter IV presents the case study, currently 
ongoing in the Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA) in Korea, to derive the acceptable 
range of BTO-rs contract conditions given uncertainty in ridership forecasting. 
Chapter V specifies the decision variables, objective functions and an uncertainty 
variable with which to conduct the RDM approach. A multi-objective function is 
developed to establish the interest of the government and private partner with a focus 
on minimizing of government’s payments (GP) and maximizing the project’s NPV, 
and the objective functions are optimized to derive the plausible range of contract 
conditions under the BTO-rs scheme.  
Chapter VI presents a regret-based robustness evaluation criterion, through which 
 
3 Robust contract conditions are defined as those that minimize government payments and maximize the 
project’s NPV while also limiting the range of variance in the government's payments and NPV levels in most 
situations. 
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various feasible contract conditions are evaluated and a vulnerability analysis is 
conducted to find robust contract conditions. Based on the analysis, Chapter VII 
summarizes the results of this study, presents the conclusion, and discusses limitations. 
 
II. Related Literature 
  
There have been several studies of the conditions of contracts related to demand 
forecasting in PPP projects. However, all of them assumed that the uncertainty in 
demand forecasting is controllable and all were based on the ‘predict-then-act’ 
concept, the opposite of the 'bottom-up' concept, which is the basic analysis 
framework of RDM. These approaches start with the assumption that uncertainty is 
predictable and that the error specification is wide enough to represent the future. 
However, a fundamental problem is that if the prediction is not correct, subsequent 
decisions are subject to higher rates of incorrectness.  
Yang and Meng (2000) analyzed optimal capacity and toll levels for PPP road 
projects with an ‘assumed’ accurate point estimate for future traffic volumes. Chen 
et al. (2003) developed a multi-objective programming model to maximize private 
investors’ expected profits and minimize the risk of projects. They simultaneously 
obtained the optimal toll and capacity for a BOT-road project using a multi-objective 
genetic algorithm with the assumption of the traffic volume as a random variable. 
Tan and Yang (2012) analyzed tolls, concession periods, and government subsidies 
according to the degree of flexibility in a PPP project contract. They considered the 
uncertainty in traffic demand forecasting using observed traffic volumes but failed 
to reflect the future growth and volatility of the traffic volume. Feng et al. (2016) 
designed a negotiation process in a PPP project as a two-stage optimization problem 
and computed a government payment schedule according to toll scenarios. They 
showed that renegotiations occur in a BOT road contract when the investor’s 
behavior due to loss aversion is at a sufficiently low level. However, this approach 
lacks consideration of the uncertainty in traffic demand forecasting. Zhang et al. 
(2018) also compared socially optimal prices of tolls, road capacities, and concession 
periods under a single period concession structure and a two-period concession 
structure of BOT PPP contracts without reflecting the uncertainty of traffic demand 
forecasts. 
In addition, PPP contract specification problems have been studied with a rather 
narrow vision toward future states, as contract specifications are countable. 
Accordingly, the problem is often framed within a limited number of scenarios. In 
such studies, a binomial lattice is a preferred modeling scheme for dealing with 
contract specifications, as it branches all possible scenarios related to future changes 
with a tree structure. Similar to the binomial lattice, Bowe and Lee (2004) utilized the 
log-transformed binomial valuation model developed by Trigeorgis (1996) for valuing 
several compound options associated with a high-speed rail project in Taiwan. This 
binomial valuation method was further developed (Ho and Liao, 2011) by integrating 
fuzzy theory in order to reflect forms of flexibility in investment decisions, such as 
expansions, extensions, or even the abandonment of an underlying project. 
As such, previous studies researched PPP contract conditions such as toll levels, 
road capacities and concession periods based on the simple assumption that the 
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uncertainty of demand forecasting is calculable and the results of demand forecasts 
are accurate. However, this paper considers the uncertainty of demand forecasting as 
incalculable.  
Due to the limitations of existing studies, the PPP contract conditions associated 
with travel demand forecasting must be approached with RDM, which examines the 
existence of deep uncertainty. RDM (Lempert and Collins, 2007) identifies potential 
strategies, evaluates trade-offs by calculating the vulnerabilities of such strategies, 
and conducts adaptive decision making. Recently, Kasprzyk et al. (2013) proposed 
the method of multi-objective robust decision making (MORDM), which expands 
RDM to a decision-making issue featuring the functions of multiple objectives. 
Adopting this multi-objective function helps stakeholders navigate the space of 
feasible strategies and discover alternatives using optimal trade-offs. That is, unlike 
the ‘predict-then-act’ or ‘top-down’ approaches to policy that assume an accurate 
forecast, RDM is a bottom-up approach and develops contract conditions which deal 
with vulnerability while also minimizing any negative effects due to deep 
uncertainty. RDM, which tests a significant number of cases and seeks to construct 
scenarios using the identified vulnerabilities caused by deep uncertainties, is suitable 
for dealing with uncertainty in travel demand forecasting, which shows a wide range 
of change, even from day to day.  
 
III. Built-Transfer-Operation (BTO)-rs scheme 
 
The Korean government had been striving to reduce its financial burden and lower 
user fees, and it introduced a risk-sharing scheme for built-transfer-operation (BTO) 
projects in 2015. In the BTO scheme, investment and operating risks belong to the 
private partner; however, the investment and operating risks are shared by the 
government and the private partner at a certain ratio, and both share excess profits 
or losses under the BTO risk-sharing (BTO-rs) scheme. 
If the share of the investment costs between the government and the private partner 
is evenly split, the private partner can receive a certain portion of the operating costs 
from the government when demand for the infrastructure facility or service is not 
sufficient. However, when demand exceeds the contracted forecast, the government 
receives a partial return of the private partner’s profits. Because the government 
shares a portion of the private sector’s investment risk, the rate of return of the private 
partner’s investment is reduced, ultimately lowering user fees associated with the 
project as well. 
Figure 1 presents a schematic explanation of the cash flow under the BTO-rs 
scheme. As shown in the figure, important contract conditions in the BTO-rs scheme 
are the ratio of investment cost sharing by the government to the total private 
investment 
2
( )p , the ratio of excess profits or losses shared by the government to 
the operational profits or losses ( ) , the ratio of the construction subsidy toward 
the total project cost 
1
( )x , the level of user fees ( )P , and ridership for operational 
year i ( )
i
K . When 
2
p  and   are both zero, there is no government risk sharing 
for private investment, meaning that this situation is identical to the BTO scheme, 
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FIGURE 1. CASH FLOW OF THE BTO-RS SCHEME 
 
where only a construction subsidy exists.  
There is a construction subsidy for cash-in during the construction period (from 1 
through n ), and the construction subsidy by the government can be expressed as 
the total project cost ( )TPC  of the project multiplied by the ratio of the construction 
subsidy 
1
( )x  . Additionally, there are two items for cash outflows during the 
construction period in the BTO-rs scheme; these are related to the private partner’s 
investment cost. The first is the private partner’s investment cost excluding the 
shared investment cost by the government 
1
( )CC  , and the second is the shared 
investment cost by the government as part of the private partner’s investment cost 
2
( )CC . Here, the 
1
CC  can be converted as 
1 1 2
(1 )(1 )CC TPC x p    and 
2
CC  
can be determined from the total project cost ( )TPC  excluding the government’s 
construction subsidy multiplied by the ratio of investment cost sharing by the 
government to the total private investment cost 
2
( )p , 
2 1 2
(1 )CC TPC x p  . 
During the operational period (from 1n   through N ), he cash inflow contains 
two items: the government’s payment ( )GP  for the shared cost by the government 
among the private partner’s investment 
2
( )CC 4  and the operating revenue 
attributable to the private partner 
1
( )OR . Here, the government’s payment ( )GP  
can be calculated by 
2 1
(1 )GP CC r    , where 
1
r  denotes the private partner’s 
expected rate of return for the 
2
CC  . In addition, 
1
OR   can be expressed as 
1
(1 ) (1 )OR OR K P       , where OR  indicates the operating revenue. The 
cash outflow during the operational period ( )N n  is the operating cost borne by 
the private partner 
1
( )OC  . 
1
OC  can be expressed as the operating cost of the 
 
4Cash inflow in the BTO-rs scheme is similar to the structure of the BTL scheme, which recovers its investment 
through government payments. In this respect, the BTO-rs scheme is referred to as a hybrid BTO and BTL scheme. 
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project ( )OC  multiplied by one minus the ratio of excess losses shared by the 
government to the operational losses ( ) , 
1
(1 )OC OC   . 
Therefore, the government’s payment during operational year i  , 
i
GP  , can be 







( , , , , , ) ( )
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K  is the contracted ridership forecast and 
i
OC  is the operating cost for 
operational year i . 
Under the BTO-rs scheme, the government’s payment during operational year i  
( )
i
GP  occurs when the risk sharing base amount ( )
i
GC  for year i  exceeds the 




OR  for year i . However, when 
2i
OR  exceeds 
i
GC , there will be a reimbursement to the government corresponding 
to the difference for operational year i . Therefore, 
i
GC  is the base amount that 
determines whether the government pays or is reimbursed during year i . 
i
GP  and 
i
GC  can be specified as follows: 
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IV. Case Study: Urban Railway PPP Project 
 
This paper conducts a case study of an urban railway PPP project, referred to as 
the A-Line project, currently ongoing in the Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA) in 
Korea, to derive the acceptable range of the contract conditions under the uncertainty 
of ridership forecasting. 
The Ministry of Land and Transport (MOLT) put out a request for proposals (RFP) 
for the A-Line as a BTO-rs scheme in December of 2017 after assessing the project’s 
profitability, benefit to the public, user affordability, and efficiency gains. Two 
bidders forming a consortium of builders, maintenance operators, and financial 
institutions submitted project proposals to the MOLT, and the MOLT started 
negotiations with the preferred bidder from May of 2018. However, the MOLT and 
a private concessionaire concluded an agreement that the project would proceed in 
October of 2018 as a standard BTO project due to the possible negative effects of 
BTO-rs contract conditions.  
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TABLE 1— PROPOSAL IN THE BTO-RS AND CONTRACTED CONDITIONS IN BTO 
BTO_rs (proposal) BTO (contracted) 
Length 43.6km 
No. of stations five stations  
Construction Period 60 months 
operation period 30 years 
Total Project Cost (TPC) KRW 2,953.4 billion KRW 2,901.7 billion 
Construction Cost KRW 2,150.0 billion KRW 2,143 billion 
Construction Subsidy KRW 455.3 billion KRW 1,373.7 billion 
Total Private Investment KRW 2,837,7 billion KRW 1,702.1 billion 
Total Operation Cost (30 years) KRW 3,723.0 billion KRW 3,699.9 billion 
Fare KRW 2,419 + KRW 216 / 5km KRW 2,592 + KRW 216 / 5km 
Passengers in 2025 299,083 passengers / day 263,529 passengers / day 
Passengers in 2030 298,981 passengers /day 262,279 passengers / day 
IRR (BTO) - 5.2% 
Cost sharing portion by MOLT in private investment 40% - 
Shared portion by MOLT of excess operation profits 1.00% - 
Source: MOLT, “A-Line Concession Agreement,” 2018. 
 
The A-Line’s length is 43.6km, and it is designed to pass through five stations. 
The total project cost was KRW 2,901.7 billion, of which KRW 1,373.7 billion was 
subsidized by the government and KRW 1,702.1 billion came from an investment by 
a private partner. The private concessionaire has the right to operate the A-Line for 
30 years (See Table 1 for more details), with this contract expiring in 2054.  
Table 1 presents the concessionaire’s proposal for the BTO-rs scheme and the 
contracted conditions under the BTO scheme. Under the BTO-rs scheme, the 
concessionaire had requested 21.2% of the construction cost as a subsidy from the 
MOLT, while in the BTO contract, they concluded that 47.3% of the total project 
cost ( )TPC  would be paid by the government as a construction subsidy.  
The contracted forecast ridership set by the contract is 73,159,276 passengers in 
2024, the first year of service. After the opening year, the contracted forecast 
ridership ( )
i
K  increases steadily to 89,366,742 passengers in 2026, after which it 
deceases to 2045. The contracted forecast ridership remains fixed for ten years after 
76,163,655 passengers in 2045. 
Table 2 and Figure 2 show the contracted forecast ridership based on which the 
agreement between the concessionaire and the government was made.  
The initial tariff on the first service date was contracted as the sum of the basic 
fare and travel distance fare. The basic fare was KRW 2,592 and the travel distance 
fare was KRW 216 for every 5 km. Subsequent fare adjustments are applied based 
on the cumulative monthly changes in the consumer price index (CPI) once a year, 
and the concessionaire reports this figure to MOLT after the fare change. Meanwhile, 
the basic fare was proposed as KRW 2,419 and the travel distance fare was KRW 
216 for every 5 km under the BTO-rs scheme.  
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2024 73,159,276 2034 84,460,971 2044 76,864,766 
2025 88,108,286 2035 83,653,540 2045 76,163,655 
2026 89,366,742 2036 82,856,807 2046 76,163,655 
2027 88,947,814 2037 82,060,075 2047 76,163,655 
2028 88,528,551 2038 81,263,343 2048 76,163,655 
2029 88,109,623 2039 80,466,611 2049 76,163,655 
2030 87,690,361 2040 79,669,879 2050 76,163,655 
2031 86,882,930 2041 78,968,768 2051 76,163,655 
2032 86,075,499 2042 78,267,322 2052 76,163,655 
2033 85,268,402 2043 77,566,211 2053 76,163,655 
Source: MOLT, “A-Line Concession Agreement,” 2018. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. YEARLY CONTRACTED FORECAST RIDERSHIP () 
  
V. Optimal Contract Conditions under the BTO-rs scheme 
  
A. Objective Function 
 
A multi-objective function is developed to establish the interest of the government 
and the private partner, i.e., to minimize the total government’s payments ( )GP  for 
the entire operational period while maximizing the project’s NPV. The objective 
functions are optimized to derive the acceptable range of contract conditions under 
the BTO-rs scheme. 
 




The first objective function is to maximize the NPV of the project and to search 
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for optimal contract conditions, such as 
2 21
( , , , , )p rx P  given the ridership for 
operational year i . 
 
(4)     
1 1 2 2
( , , , , | , 1, , )
i
F x p P K i n Nr     
Here, 
2
r  is the expected rate of return for the government’s shared cost of the 
private investment. 
The private partner seeks to maximize the NPV of the project. The NPV function 
under the BTO-rs scheme is formulated as follows:   
 





(1 ) (1 )
n N
i i i i
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   
Using equation (5), the first objective function under the BTO-rs scheme can be 
expressed as shown below. The NPV increases as P  , 
1
x  , and 
2
p   increase. 
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F x p P K i n Nr     
 
The second objective function is to minimize total government’s payments ( )GP  
for entire operational period. The objective of the government can be expressed in 
the form of various interests, such as maximization of social welfare or benefits and 
the provision of the service in time at a reasonable user fee level given applicable 
budget constraints. However, minimizing GP   is set as an objective of the 
government, as the other interests are already considered or resolved during the 
project appraisal process. 
Under the BTO-rs scheme, 
i
GP  occurs when 
i




GP  can be 
expressed by the following function, which includes the variable, 
2
p  , the 
corresponding rate of return of the private partner’s investment 
2
( )r ,  , 
1





(7)   1 2 11 2 1 ( )
1
(1 )
( , , , , , ) ( )
1 (1 )
i i i iN n
TPC x p r








Accordingly, the government’s payments ( )GP  for the entire operational period 
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can be established using the following equation:  
 
(8)      





( , , , , | , 1, , )
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i iN n i n
F x p r P K i n N
TPC x p r




   
 
 





The government’s payment is squared because it is assumed that the government 
minimizes unexpected increases in government payments to private investors arising 
from the BTO-rs scheme and does not seek to maximize financial revenue.  
 
B. Narrowing Down to Plausible Contract Conditions 
 
The contract conditions as decision variables for optimizing the objective 
functions in this paper are 
2
p ,  , and 
1
x , given the contracted forecast ridership 
figure for operational year i  ( )
i





r  for simplicity and for the convenience of the calculation. The value of 
1
r , 
indicating the expected rate of return for private investment, is set to 5.2%, which is 
the contracted IRR of the A-Line project. Additionally, 
2
r  is set to 1.02% and is the 
level of the interest rate on Korea’s government bonds. This implies an expected rate 
of return for the government’s shared cost in the private investment. Regarding the 
range of P , it was increased from KRW 2,000 in KRW 100 intervals to a maximum 
of KRW 3,000, and sets of contract conditions (
2
p  ,   , 
1
x  ) are identified by 
optimizing the objective functions. 
Before the robustness tests of the contract conditions are carried out, it is desirable 
to reduce the contract conditions to an ensemble of plausible futures. The study 
resolves this issue by restricting the range of the contract conditions and further by 
removing infeasible contract conditions. In particular, the set of feasible contract 
conditions is identified through a multi-objective optimization process using a 
genetic algorithm.  
The initial values for 
2
p ,   and 
1
x  are obtained from the proposed BTO-rs 
contract conditions for the A-Line project (
1
16%x   , 
2
40%p   , 1%   ). In 
addition, the upper limit of 
1
x  is set to 50%, which is the largest construction 
subsidy ratio for a railway PPP project in Korea.  
Table 3 shows the initial value and lower- and upper-limit values for the 




p ,  ). 
The NSGA-II algorithm (Hadka et al., 2015) is used to identify feasible sets of 
contract condition variables that optimize the two objective functions. In the NSGA-
II algorithm, if the initial solutions are given in the search space of the decision 
variables, a new set of candidate solutions is created through genetic modification 
(crossover and mutation), and individual candidate solutions are repeatedly 





p ,  ) given the levels of P , 
1
r  and 
2
r , contracted the  
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TABLE 3— INITIAL VALUES AND LOWER- AND UPPER-LIMIT VALUES 
OF THE CONTRACT CONDITION VARIABLES 
Variables Descriptions Initial Value Range  
 
Ratio of the construction cost subsidy by the government 
to the total project construction cost 
0.16(16%) 0 ≤  ≤ 0.5 (50%) 
 
Ratio of investment cost sharing by the government to 
the total private investment  
0.4(40%) 0 ≤  ≤ 1.0 (100%) 
 
Ratio of excess profits or losses shared by the 
government to the operational profits or losses 




K , and created offspring through crossover and mutation. The evolution 
process is repeatedly applied to a set of offspring more than 100 times.  




p ,  ) that optimizes the objective functions is an approximate 
solution for the frontier that considers the offsetting effects of government payments 
and the project’s NPV while being simultaneously deemed a set of selectable contract 
conditions.  
 
C. Feasible Contract Conditions 
 
The fare ( P  ) is increased from KRW 2,000 in increments of KRW 100 to a 
maximum of KRW 3,000 and the sets of contract conditions (
1
x  , 
2
p  ,   ) are 
investigated under the given levels of P , 
1
r  and 
2
r  and the contracted forecast 
i
K . 




p ,  ), sets of contract conditions that are deemed 
infeasible for both private investors and the government are excluded owing to the 
project’s negative NPV, rendering the project itself unsustainable, and when the 
government’s payment is very high. In particular, we exclude the set of contract 
conditions for which government payments exceeded KRW 30 million during the 
operational period and produced a negative NPV outcome.  
Table 4 shows the 18 optimal sets of contract conditions (
1
x  , 
2
p  ,   ), the 
corresponding government payments, and the project’s NPV under the given P  
after excluding infeasible contract conditions. The ratio of the construction subsidy 
to the total project cost (
1
x ) is found to be close to the maximum value of 50%, and 
the ratio of excess profits or losses shared by the government to the operational 
profits or losses ( ) shows a rate of less than 20%.  
Under the [No. 1] contract condition, 
1
x  is 48.25%, close to the maximum of 
50%, while 
2
p  and   are insignificant at 1.44% and 0.51%, respectively. It was 
also found that the NPV is approximately 458.9 billion won and that no additional 
government payment had arisen. In particular, the analysis showed that it is possible 
to conclude a contract at fare 2,000 won, which is much lower than the current BTO 
project user fee of 2,700 won. Under the [No. 4] contract condition, 
1
x  is calculated 
at 39.22%, which is far below the 50% maximum. However, 
2
p  and   are also 
insignificant at 3.67% and 1.40%, respectively. The fare level is 2,100 won, which  
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(KRW 10 Million) 
1 2000 48.25 1.44 0.51 0.00 4589.17 
2 2000 49.57 7.79 2.68 0.22 5376.70 
3 2000 49.88 49.98 17.09 0.37 8489.59 
4 2100 39.22 3.67 1.40 0.00 4118.16 
5 2100 50.00 49.95 15.66 0.00 10069.90 
6 2200 50.00 49.99 14.50 0.00 11634.20 
7 2300 49.70 41.14 11.17 0.01 12509.76 
8 2300 49.99 49.99 13.49 0.04 13197.20 
9 2400 50.00 49.99 12.61 0.00 14762.96 
10 2500 3.84 43.45 19.79 0.02 7177.64 
11 2500 49.95 49.97 11.85 1.05 16317.23 
12 2600 24.07 48.88 16.56 0.34 13134.24 
13 2600 38.48 39.04 10.71 10.60 14881.25 
14 2700 49.98 49.66 10.48 0.01 19436.51 
15 2800 48.87 36.20 7.41 0.02 19831.08 
16 2800 49.95 48.98 9.81 0.19 20949.70 
17 2900 50.00 49.16 9.35 0.90 22540.01 
18 3000 50.00 49.99 9.06 0.04 24166.19 
Note: The table presents only contract conditions that are feasible for both private investors and the government. 
  
 
FIGURE 3. ,  AND  ACCORDING TO THE SETS OF CONTRACT CONDITIONS 
 
is lower than 2,700, and the NPV is 411.8 billion won. It was also found that no 
additional government payments had occurred. 
Under the [No. 10] contract condition, where the user fee is 2,500 won, 
1
x  is 
3.84% which is lower than any other contract conditions. However,   shows the 
highest level, at 19.79%. As a result, the NPV is slightly lower at around KRW 717.8 
billion. For the [No. 18] contract condition, where the NPV is largest, 
1
x  and 
2
p  
are found to be highest. 
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FIGURE 4.  AND NPV ACCORDING TO THE SETS OF CONTRACT CONDITIONS  
 
VI. Robust Optimal Contract Conditions 
  
We identified sets of contract conditions that optimize the two objective functions 
of maximizing the project’s NPV and minimizing the government’s payments ( )GP . 
In the analysis thus far, however, the contracted forecast ridership for operational 
year i  (
i
K  ) is used, consisting of the simple average and aggregate ridership 
forecasts and assuming that the ridership forecasts are accurate.  
This section considers the uncertainty of ridership forecasts. By assuming that the 
probability distribution of ridership forecasting is not known and the uncertainty is 
not calculable or controllable, this paper suggests robust contract conditions that 
minimize the government payment and maximize the project’s NPV, while also 
limiting the ranges of the variances in the government payment and the NPV in most 
situations. 
 
A. Uncertainty in Forecasted Ridership 
 
To characterize uncertainty in ridership forecasts for the 30-year operation period, 
this paper assumes that the ridership forecast follows geometric Brownian motion 
(GBM) (see Kim et al., 2012 and Kim, 2017), with GBM including all possible 
effects of the ridership forecasts caused by the uncertain variables. GBM, a model 
widely used in financial engineering, is used to predict the movements of variables 
with deep uncertainty (see Martin and Rennie, 1996). In the GBM model, once 
variables move in one direction, the probability of moving in the same direction 
increases. This phenomenon is observed in actual travel demand. It should be noted 
that any specification method such as random sampling or bootstrapping can be 
applied for uncertainty specification of the ridership forecast. According to GBM, 
the forecasted ridership of the A-Line during year t  is dependent on the increasing 
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Here, 
t
K  is the ridership of the A-Line in year t  and 
0
K  is the ridership in the 
first year of service. 
t
W  is the standard Wiener process that follows a normal 
distribution, where the average is 0 and the standard deviation is 1.    is the 
increasing rate of ridership and   is the corresponding volatility.  
The ridership for the opening year (
0
K ) in equation (9) is generated based on the 
probability distribution of the ridership forecasting error ( E ) in currently operating 
Korean PPP projects. After defining the ridership forecasting error ( E  ) as the 
forecasted ridership (
fK ) relative to the actual out-turn ridership ( K ), 0K  is then 
generated using a random number (e ) of the probability distribution of E  and 
fK . 
Note that 
fK  is the contracted forecast ridership for the commercial operational 
year of the A-Line, which in this case is 3,159,276 passengers. 
 






   
The parameters of the probability distribution of the ridership forecasting error 
( E ) are estimated using the actual out-turn ridership in the currently operating PPP 
projects, i.e., the Incheon Airport Railroad, New Bundang Line, SMA Line 9, Busan-
Gimhae Light Railway and the Uijeongbu Light Railway. Meanwhile, to generate 
t
K , the increasing rate of ridership ( ) and its volatility ( ) are applied from the 
actual observations of the above PPP projects. They are currently running throughout 
the Seoul Metropolitan Area, where the A-Line is located. In particular, the study 
considers the ramp-up effect of ridership during the operation year by applying 
different increasing rates of   and  . Ramp-up refers to the phenomenon of the 
actual ridership changing. The ridership fluctuates during the early service period, 
but it is expected to stabilize over time. This study found that the number of 
passengers was highly volatile during the first six years after the opening of the 
service, after which it stabilized (SMRTC, 2008). Accordingly, this paper sets 1  
and 1  to 0.147 and 0.097, respectively, from the opening year to the sixth year of 
the service, and sets 2  and 
2
  from the seventh year to the thirtieth year of 
service to 0.0147 and 0.0097, respectively, values which are assumed, 
correspondingly, to be 10% of 1  and 
1
 . Meanwhile, to consider the wide range 
of possible values of 
t
K , a combination of  and  is used. The minimum and 
maximum values of   and   are set to 50% and 150% of the reference values in 
each case, with 
t
K  then generated using a combination of values of   and   
within these limits. Accordingly, from the opening year to the fifth year of service, 
we assume that the probability distributions of 1   and 
1
   follow uniform 
distributions with a lower limit of 50% and an upper limit of 150% around the 
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baseline values ( 1 10.1471, 0.0966
b b
    ). Meanwhile, 2
b
   and 2
b
   are 
assumed to be 77% (1/1.3) of 1
b




   ), from the sixth year to the thirtieth year of service. 
 
B. Variations in  and NPV caused by the uncertainty in ridership forecasts 
 
This section identifies the variations of GP  and NPV  given the 18 sets of 




p ,  ) according to the uncertainty of the forecasted 
ridership. To do this, 
t
K  is generated five hundred times using random numbers of 
the uniform probability distributions of   and   and the exponential distribution 
of the ridership for the opening year (
0
K ). 
Table 5 shows the mean and standard deviation of GP  and NPV  of the project 
in the 18 sets of contract conditions caused by the uncertainty of ridership forecasts. 
For instance, in the [No. 1] contract condition, mean and the corresponding standard 
deviation of GP   are 21.12 and 12.04 billion, respectively. The corresponding 
NPV ’s mean and standard deviation are KRW 661.64 and KRW 1217.00 billion, 
respectively. Among the 18 sets of optimal contract conditions, the standard 
deviation of GP  is small in the order of [No. 1], KRW 12.04 billion; [No. 4], KRW 
34.47 billion; and [No. 2], KRW 64.98. The standard deviation of NPV  is small in 
the order of [No. 3], KRW 802.23 billion; [No. 5], KRW 871.14 billion; and [No. 
10], KRW 924.09 billion. 
 












 (KRW Billion) NPV (KRW Billion) 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
1 2000 48.25 1.44 0.51 21.12 12.04 661.64 1217.00 
2 2000 49.57 7.79 2.68 113.36 64.98 554.44 1188.44 
3 2000 49.88 49.98 17.09 692.36 404.90 123.32 800.23 
4 2100 39.22 3.67 1.40 59.86 34.47 765.29 1205.88 
5 2100 50.00 49.95 15.66 679.63 386.10 178.62 871.14 
6 2200 50.00 49.99 14.50 667.77 366.88 272.22 955.98 
7 2300 49.70 41.14 11.17 531.32 299.26 241.68 1093.60 
8 2300 49.99 49.99 13.49 649.61 367.22 387.91 1058.60 
9 2400 50.00 49.99 12.61 621.69 359.12 522.34 1138.62 
10 2500 3.84 43.45 19.79 1000.88 573.83 101.90 924.09 
11 2500 49.95 49.97 11.85 613.38 359.56 567.34 1192.24 
12 2600 24.07 48.88 16.56 888.67 509.00 355.45 1085.21 
13 2600 38.48 39.04 10.71 584.20 323.89 319.18 1253.32 
14 2700 49.98 49.66 10.48 578.81 333.67 731.48 1289.38 
15 2800 48.87 36.20 7.41 422.88 248.03 698.98 1491.35 
16 2800 49.95 48.98 9.81 574.87 320.08 811.72 1376.81 
17 2900 50.00 49.16 9.35 548.37 329.51 997.58 1483.32 
18 3000 50.00 49.99 9.06 551.51 322.73 1035.56 1485.88 
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FIGURE 5. DISPERSION OF  
 
 
FIGURE 6. DISPERSION OF NPV 
 
The [No. 10] contract condition shows the highest expected GP  , while the 
highest NPV  occurs in the [No. 18] contract conditions. These results show that 
there is a risk of excessive government payments to the private partner as well as 
non-profitability of the project due to the uncertainty of ridership forecasting.  
 
C. Robust Contract Conditions under Ridership Forecasting Uncertainty 
 
This section presents robust contract conditions among the 18 sets of contract 
conditions that minimize any unforeseen increase in government payments and the 
deterioration of the viability of the project as possibly caused by ridership forecasting 
uncertainty.  
The robustness evaluations of the 18 sets of contract conditions are conducted 
considering the following regret-based measures presented by Herman et al. (2015). 
Herman et al. (2015) defined the robustness evaluation indicator 
i
R , for objective 
function i   as the rate of change of the objective function i   relative to the 
predetermined baseline value of the objective function.  
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Here, ( , 0.9)q i  refers to the ninetieth percentile and ( , )
i
F c s  refers to the value 
of the objective function i  consisting c  and s  . In addition, c  refers a set of 
contract conditions 
1 2
( , , )x p   and s  is the element of S  , which is a set of 
parameters related to the uncertainty of the ridership forecast, 
0
K  ,   and   . 
Moreover, s  represents the baseline values of 
0
K ,   and  , and N  refers to 
the number of objective functions,  a value which is two here.  
The denominator, which is the value of the objective function ( , )
i
F c s , can be 
zero in equation (11). Accordingly, this paper adopted the robustness evaluation 
indicator 
i
R  as the robustness value. It is defined as shown below.  
 
(12)   ( ) max( ( , ) ( , ),0) |, 0.9i s S i iR c q F c s F c s   
Meanwhile, when the values of the respective objective functions have identical 
units and are comparable, the upper limit of 
i
R  can be used as the regret-based 
measure, and the ninetieth percentile of the set of contract conditions is assumed 
contains robust contract conditions.  
 
(13)       ( ) max { ( ), 1, , }
i i
R c R c i N    
Table 6 shows the 18 sets of optimal contract conditions 
1 2
( , , )x p   and the 
corresponding values of 
1
R  and 
2
R . If 
1
R , indicating the robustness measure of 
1
F  , is large, it can be said that the NPV  of the project fluctuates considerably 
according to the uncertainty of the ridership forecasts. If 
2
R  is small, it can be said 
that GP   changes only slightly according to the uncertainty of the ridership 
forecasts, and the contract condition is a robust condition which enables the 
government to minimize the vulnerability and negative results of GP . Accordingly, 
2
R  shows the largest value in the [No. 10] contract condition, whereas for 
1
R , [No. 
18] has the largest value. 
2
R  is small in the order of contract conditions [Nos. 1, 4, 
2], where 
2
p  and   are insignificant. This arises because with smaller values of 
GP , 
2
p  and  , less change occurs in GP . On the other hand, the 
1
R  values 
are small in the order of the [No. 2], [No. 1], [No. 10] and [No. 4] conditions.  
Considering 
1
R  and 
2
R  at the same time, the sets of contract conditions [No. 
1], [No. 2] and [No. 4] are suggested to be the most desirable robust contract 
conditions for the A-Line project, as they minimize unforeseen increases in 
government payments and the deterioration of the viability of the project possibly 
caused by uncertainty in the ridership forecasts. 
The robust contract conditions suggest 
1
x  as 48.25%, 49.57% and 39.22%, 
respective to the conditions above. They also correspondingly suggest 
2
p  as 1.44%, 
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1 2000 48.25 1.44 0.51 17923.38 366.19 
2 2000 49.57 7.79 2.68 15904.79 1958.61 
3 2000 49.88 49.98 17.09 20264.04 12181.48 
4 2100 39.22 3.67 1.40 19241.65 1064.81 
5 2100 50.00 49.95 15.66 23954.98 11906.76 
6 2200 50.00 49.99 14.50 27350.62 11365.37 
7 2300 49.70 41.14 11.17 29434.33 9184.91 
8 2300 49.99 49.99 13.49 31433.40 11134.05 
9 2400 50.00 49.99 12.61 35334.64 10808.10 
10 2500 3.84 43.45 19.79 19153.82 17702.72 
11 2500 49.95 49.97 11.85 37303.27 10566.78 
12 2600 24.07 48.88 16.56 30703.16 15407.15 
13 2600 38.48 39.04 10.71 35557.77 10062.51 
14 2700 49.98 49.66 10.48 44154.89 10136.89 
15 2800 48.87 36.20 7.41 46077.94 7465.47 
16 2800 49.95 48.98 9.81 47970.95 9844.12 
17 2900 50.00 49.16 9.35 52050.39 9677.41 
18 3000 50.00 49.99 9.06 53683.86 9663.22 
 
 
FIGURE 7. SCATTER DIAGRAM OF  AND  
  
7.79% and 3.67% and   as 0.51%, 2.68% and 1.40% in [No. 1], [No. 2] and [No. 4]. 
 
D. Comparison Total Government Payment and User Fee  
between the BTO-rs and BTO Schemes 
 
MOLT put out a request for proposals (RFP) for the A-Line project as a BTO-rs 
scheme; however, MOLT and a private concessionaire concluded an agreement that 
the project will be processed as a standard BTO project due to the possible negative 
effects caused by the BTO-rs contract conditions. In this section, the total 
government payment and fare level amounts are compared between the suggested 
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18 contract conditions and a current BTO contract condition. 5  Here, the total 
government payment is the amount including the construction cost subsidy by the 
government for the BTO contract and GP  as well as the construction subsidy in 
the case of BTO-rs scheme. In the current BTO contract, 47.3% of the total project 
cost is paid by the government as a construction subsidy, and the user fee is KRW 
2,707. 
Note that contract conditions [No. 1], [No. 2] and [No. 4] were robust contract 
conditions under the BTO-rs scheme. Table 7 shows that the total expected 
government payments in contract conditions [No. 4] and [No. 10] are smaller than 
those of the current BTO contract among the 18 contract conditions. The fare levels 
are also KRW 2,100 and KRW 2,500, respectively, which are lower than the KRW 
2,707 of the current BTO contract. However, the [No. 10] contract condition is not 
robust and is exposed to the risk of incurring additional government payments due 
to the uncertainty of ridership forecasts. In addition, for the [No. 2] contract condition, 
suggested as a robust contract condition under the BTO-rs scheme, the total expected 
government payment for the project is KRW 1,551.76 billion, which exceeds the 
value of KRW 1,373.7 billion under the current BTO contract. Accordingly, the [No. 
4] contract condition is more suitable under the BTO-rs scheme from the perspective 
of the government and users. The total government payment is estimated to be KRW 
1197.95 billion under the [No. 4] contract condition. 
 
TABLE 7— COMPARISON OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS AND USER FEES 








BTO-rs BTO BTO-rs BTO 
1 1,421.12 1,373.70 2,000 2,707 
2 1,551.76 1,373.70 2,000 2,707 
3 2,139.66 1,373.70 2,000 2,707 
4 1,197.95 1,373.70 2,100 2,707 
5 2,130.47 1,373.70 2,100 2,707 
6 2,118.54 1,373.70 2,200 2,707 
7 1,973.35 1,373.70 2,300 2,707 
8 2,100.23 1,373.70 2,300 2,707 
9 2,072.45 1,373.70 2,400 2,707 
10 1,112.18 1,373.70 2,500 2,707 
11 2,062.70 1,373.70 2,500 2,707 
12 1,587.14 1,373.70 2,600 2,707 
13 1,700.89 1,373.70 2,600 2,707 
14 2,029.22 1,373.70 2,700 2,707 
15 1841.08 1,373.70 2,800 2,707 
16 2024.3 1,373.70 2,800 2,707 
17 1999.22 1,373.70 2,900 2,707 
18 2002.35 1,373.70 3,000 2,707 
 
5It is impossible to compare NPVs of the project because there is no data for the current BTO contract.  
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FIGURE 8. COMPARISON OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS 
 
VII. Summary and Conclusion 
  
PPP projects in Korea face criticism due to unexpected hikes in the government’s 
payments to private partners and high user fees. Accordingly, the Korean government 
has been striving to reduce its financial burden and lower user fees, and it introduced 
the BTO-rs scheme to lower the high user fees by reducing the project risk borne by 
private partners. 
This paper suggested robust BTO-rs contract conditions that minimize negative 
effects on governments and private partners considering the uncertainty in ridership 
forecasts. The sets of contract conditions for which government payments resulted 
in more than KRW 30 million for the operational period and negative NPV outcomes 
were excluded, and robust contract conditions that could reduce government 
payments and user fees while maintaining clear profitability of the project were 
selected. When we compared the robust contract conditions of the current BTO 
contract and determined the total expected government payment in the [No. 4] 
condition, we suggested  ,    and   rates of 39.22%, 3.67% and 1.40%, 
respectively, which were lower than those of the current BTO contract. In addition, 
the fare level was KRW 2,100, which is lower than the KRW 2,707 of the current 
BTO contract.  
Several areas can be suggested for further study. In this paper, the GBM model is 
adopted to determine the probability distribution of the forecasted ridership. It should 
be noted that the generated ridership depends on the probability distribution of the 
GBM, which could, in turn, can change the robust contract conditions. Further 
research on the probability distribution of the ridership are needed. Finally, further 
research is needed with regard to how much weight should be assigned toward each 
object function to derive more practical and reliable contract conditions.  
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